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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The nature of this appeal concerns the validity of a Sheriffs Sale of personal property,

where all of the case file creditor rights-property interests owned by Defendant-Respondent,
Sharon K. Smith-Novotny-Moore-Bergmann (hereafter "Bergmann") contained in the case file
entitled Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, were sold at a sheriffs sale on November
13, 2014, as conducted pursuant to Idaho's execution statutes.
The levy undertaken by the sheriff upon that case file containing those property interests
of Bergmann was undertaken pursuant to writ (R. pp. 35-36; 45-46; 80-81; 82-83; 110-111) and
the Letter of Instruction (R. pp. 88-92; 194-198) from Plaintiff-Appellant, Royal Von Puckett
(hereafter "Puckett") to recover upon the Judgment he had against Bergmann.
At the scheduled sale, following the statutory notices and advertisement (Notice of Levy,

R. pp. 43-44; 85-86; 108-109; Notification of sale, R. pp.42; 97; 104; Recorded Writ of Execution
and Notice of Recording, R. pp. 95; 105-106; and Notice of Sheriffs Sale, R. pp. 42, 97, 104), the
sheriff sold all of the property interests in all of the creditor rights contained within the Fourth
District Court Ada County case file entitled Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684.
Though Bergmann had full knowledge of the levy, recordings, claim forms, and intended
sale, Bergmann declined to submit any objection, declined to present any claim to any exemption,
declined to attend the sale, and failed to instruct the sheriff in any manner relating to the process
of selling the case file contents consisting of her creditor rights-property interests at the sale.
Almost six weeks later, Bergmann decided to challenge the sale, and upon her motion, the
lower court vacated the sale upon the basis there was "inadequate consideration" paid by the
successful bidder (Puckett), and "irregularity" in the sale process, concluding that within the case
file there were two distinct judgments (along with a series of purported renewals), and it was not
clear to the lower court which judgment was being sold. The lower court's decision serves to
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require the sheriff to identify and sell separately the property interests contained in the levied upon
case file, as reflected in the Memorandum Decision and Order entered February 6, 2015 (R. pp.
466-473; 563-570; 621-628).
Puckett's efforts to challenge this unprecedented Order was delayed by Bergmann's
bankruptcy Petition filed March 31, 2015, preventing hearing on Puckett's Reconsideration motion

R. pp. 507-508) of that controversial Order (R. p. 466-473; 563-570; 621-628).
Puckett finally secured stay relief from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on March 5, 2019, about
which the lower court was so informed on March 11, 2018 (R. p. 824, L. 6-7), authorizing the
lower court to proceed upon Puckett's Reconsideration and any needed appeal.
The lower court heard the Reconsideration motion and declined to vacate or alter the Order

(R. p. 824-827), from which this appeal is taken to the Supreme Court (R. pp. 828-847) to confront
the abuse of discretion of the lower court that invalidated the statutorily conducted sheriffs sale under
Idaho's execution statutes.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Clerk's Record is lengthy, setting forth the history related to the issues in these

controversial proceedings. Years after Puckett obtained his money judgment against Bergmann
(November 8, 1999) and following a series of renewals thereof (R. pp. 13-30), the principal sum
and accrued interest owing on Puckett's judgment against Bergmann exceeded $173,000.00 by the
year 2014, as identified in the Affidavit of computation of amounts when securing his writ of
execution (R. pp. 31-34). Puckett had decided to seek recovery upon his Judgment.
On October 8, 2014, Puckett obtained a Writ to proceed with execution (R. pp. 35-36; 4546; 80-81; 82-83; 110-111); on October 9, 2014, Puckett instructed the sheriff to proceed (R. pp.
88-92; 194-198) with execution, directing the sheriff to a particular case file, whereupon the sheriff
levied upon and seized all of the creditor rights and property interests that Bergmann held within
that Fourth District Court case file, entitled Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684. The
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execution statutes require a judgment creditor proceed first against personal property of the debtor.
Puckett's instruction to the sheriff stated the following:
"Enclosed with this Letter oflnstruction is the Writ ofExecution issued by the Clerk of the
District Court on October 8, 2014, authorizing you to execute upon property interests she
owns, and at present we request you execute upon the personal property interest she holds
in that certain Judgment entered in her favor in the case of Smith v. Smith, CV-DR-9012684D, on February 11, 1991, and all subsequent modifications and renewals. That case
was a divorce proceeding in which Sharon K. Smith, the Plaintiff obtained a judgment
against Vernon K. Smith, the Defendant. In that case, Sharon was awarded a money
judgment, and in that proceeding she was referred to as "Smith", and you will be executing
upon that entire judgment interest she holds in that case. She has been going by her
maiden name "Bergmann" since mid-2000's, and has recorded real property transfers in
2006 while using that name, though her social security number remains the same."
(Emphasis added) (R. pp. 88; 194)
We request you commence execution upon any and all right, title, and interest of Sharon
K Smith/Bergmann, (also known as Novotny/Moore/Bergmann) in that judgment entered
in the case entitled Sharon K. Smith v. Vernon K. Smith, case# CV-DR-1990-12684,
originally filed of record in the District Court ofthe Fourth District of the State ofldaho, in
and for Ada County, on or about January 29, 1990, and judgment entered February 11,
1991. Mr. Puckett wants the property rights and interests she holds in that judgment against
Vernon K. Smith, and wants it levied upon, seized, and sold at public auction, and Mr.
Puckett will bid in his judgment at the sherifPs sale, to the extent necessary, as a credit bid,
to either Secure ownership of that judgment, or generate the funds in the bidding process to
address recovery of her debt to him. (Emphasis added) (R. pp. 89-90; 195-196)
Mr. Puckett does request you take immediate action to attach that judgment, in pursuit of this

execution process, at the earliest possible date, and schedule the matter for the earliest sale. (R
pp. 90; 196)
The Sheriff located that case file and made levy upon all creditor rights found in the case file,
preparing Notice of Sheriff's Levy as then issued and recorded on October 23, 2014, (R. pp. 43-44),
and posted notice of the sale on October 29, 2014 (R. p. 42) advertising a sheriff's sale of all creditor
rights and property interests held by Bergmann found in that case file, and scheduled the sale for
November 13, 2014.
The sale proceeded as scheduled, receiving a credit bid from Puckett, with the sheriff issuing
his Certificate of Sale of all creditor rights and property interests contained within that case file, issued
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to Puckett on November 24, 2014 (R. p. 41; 99; 103), then submitting the Sheriffs Return to the court
on December 2, 2014 (R. p. 40; 101-102).
Bergmann through her attorney, filed a motion to set aside the Sale on December 22, 2014
(R. pp. 47-48), accompanied by Bergmann's affidavit (R. pp. 49-51) and Memorandum (R. pp. 52-

60), to which Puckett responded (R. pp. 61-75) supported by affidavit (R. pp. 76-199), with Puckett
scheduling the matter for hearing January 21, 2015 (R. pp. 200-201). Bergmann submitted a Reply
Memorandum on January 16, 2015 (R. pp. 202-212), giving rise to a Supplemental Memorandum
from Puckett on January 20, 2015 (R. pp. 213-231), along with Supplemental Affidavit and Further
Supplemental Memorandum on February 4, 2015 (R. pp. 232-282).
Bergmann thereafter submitted a Supplemental Memorandum on February 4, 2015 (R. pp.
283-288), with further Affidavit (R. pp. 289-458), to which Puckett responded with Further
Supplemental Memorandum (R. pp. 459-465).
The matter was heard and the court instructed the parties to produce documents reflecting any
judgment creditor's interests Bergmann held in Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, giving rise to an
Additional Supplemental Memorandum submitted by Bergmann on February 9, 2015, (R. pp. 474478), to which Puckett moved to strike portions of Bergmann's submittal as being irrelevant to the
court's inquiry (R. pp. 479-485), along with his supporting affidavit (R. pp.486-628).
The lower court, prior to reviewing those further submittals, entered its Memorandum
Decision and Order (setting aside the Sheriff's Sale) on February 6, 2015. (R. pp. 466-473; 563-570;
621-628), not reviewing any documents filed after February 6, 2015.
Puckett filed his Motion for Reconsideration (R. pp. 507-508), and while awaiting a scheduled
hearing date from which to submit supporting memorandum of authority under Rule 7, IRCP,
Puckett's counsel undertook to secure a second Writ, issued February 20, 2015 (R. pp. 512-513), with
further instruction to the Sheriff (R. pp. 571-619) submitted on February 27, 2015 directing the sheriff
to levy again, specifically identifying all creditor right Instruments contained in the case file, by name,
with copies attached as Exhibits, "a" through "k" (all of which the sheriff before had levied upon and
sold as a single unit or lot), and pursuant to Puckett's second instruction, the Sheriff issued a second
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Notice of Levy (R. pp. 515-571), including copies of the same creditor rights-property interests
previously seized and sold, specifically identifying the Instruments by name, attached to the Levy,
identified as Exhibits, "a" through "k", and pursuant to that levy, the sheriff scheduled a second
Sheriffs Sale, advertising and publishing Notice of a second Sheriffs Sale for April 2, 2015 at 10: 15

A. M. (R. p. 514).
This subsequent levy and seizure was intended to prevent Bergmann from attempting
assignment of those property interests within that case file to another ( aware of her propensity to
conceal her real property interests), preventing such assignment while Puckett awaited proceedings
upon his Motion for Reconsideration on the enforcement of the November 13, 2014 sheriffs sale.
Once Bergmann received notice ofthe second Levy, similar to that of the first levy, Bergmann
filed a Claim of Exemption on March 24, 2015 (R. p. 631-633), to which Puckett filed his Contest of
her Claim (R. pp. 629-63 3), and prior to the scheduled hearing on Bergmann' s Claim, Bergmann filed
her Bankruptcy Petition on March 31, 2015, staying all further state court proceedings.
While Bergmann' s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition was being processed, the lower court
inquired as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings, initially on May 24, 2016, to which inquiry
Puckett replied June 7, 2016 (R. pp. 634-711), and Bergmann replied June 8, 2016 (R. pp. 712-727),
confirming the stay, with Puckett confirming his intent and desire to proceed upon his
Reconsideration motion, once the Petition was either dismissed or stay relief granted.
On August 8, 2018, the lower court again sought update (R. pp. 728-730), to which inquiry
Bergmann replied August 15, 2018 (R. pp. 731-732) and Puckett replied August 20, 2018 (R. pp.
733-763), confirming the stay still remained, with Puckett then submitting his "tentative"
memorandum of authority, to be considered once Puckett secured stay relief to proceed in state court
which was obtained on March 5, 2019.
Once securing stay relief from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court on March 5, 2019, Puckett
informed the state court on March 11, 2019 (R. p. 824, L. 6-7), from which the lower court issued
a scheduling order and thereafter heard Puckett's pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Puckett submitted a further Memorandum (R. pp. 764-778), and Bergmann submitted her
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Opposition (R. pp. 778-789) with two Declarations (R. pp. 790-792; 793-807), to which Puckett
submitted a Reply Memorandum (R. pp. 808-823), from which the lower court entered the Order
denying Puckett's Motion to Reconsider (R. pp. 824-827), from which denial and Order Puckett
took this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court (R. pp. 828-847) to address the lower court's abuse
of discretion in failing to render a decision based upon the applicable standards of law.

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to Puckett's Writ of Execution (R. pp. 35-36; 45-46; 80-81; 82-83; 110-111)) and
'

Letter oflnstruction (R. pp. 88-92; 194-198), the Ada County Sheriff levied upon and attached all
ofBergmann's creditor rights-property interests in the case file, Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR1990-12684, including a February 11, 1991 original Judgment, together with all Instruments and
renewals pertaining to any creditor rights. Puckett's Instruction successfully directed the sheriff to the
case file containing all Bergmann' s creditor rights-property interests, including the original judgment
Instrument, 1991 and the original judgment Instrument, 1999, along with a series of other renewal
Instruments. The sheriff, authorized by I. C. §11-201, elected to levy upon the case file containing all
of those creditor rights-property interests within that case file, seizing the entire case file and all
judgments and renewal instruments, rendering it seized and subject to his levy. The sheriff relied
upon I. C. §11-201, which provides the following authority, both in 2014 and to the present day:
I. C. §11-201. Property liable to seizure. All goods, chattels, moneys and other
property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor,
not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property, seized and held under
attachment in the action, are liable to execution. Shares and interest in any
corporation or company, and debts and credits, and all other property both real and
personal, or any interest in either real or personal property, and all other property
not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution in like manner as
upon writs of attachment. Gold dust must be returned by the officer as so much
money collected, at its current value, without exposing the same to sale. Until a levy,
property is not affected by the execution. (Emphasis added)
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The sheriff chose to effectuate the levy on the entire case file by that Levy conducted on
October 23, 2014, so none would then be transferred or conveyed to a third party, having been
informed ofBergmann's propensity within the content of the Instmction. The sheriff relied upon his
authority under the execution statute to levy upon the entire case file. The Letter of Instmction had
taken the sheriff to the case file, and the sheriff, being already alerted to the propensities of the debtor
from the content of the Letter oflnstmction, found that series oflnstmments, and pursuant to statute,
was authorized to levy upon and seize all creditor rights contained within that case file, Smith v. Smith,
Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, and the sheriff concluded, unless directed otherwise, the content of
those creditor rights was best suited for one single lot or unit sale, as no renewal Instmment reflected
any amount within them, and a review of the renewal statute suggested a renewal Instmment replaced
a former Instmment, and absent any direction from the judgment debtor to be addressed at the
scheduled sale, the sheriff concluded the entire case file, containing all creditor rights-property
interests of Bergmann, was best suited to be sold as a single lot, avoiding any confusion.
The Sheriffs Notice of Levy (R. pp. 43-44), Notice of Sheriffs sale (R. p. 42), and Sheriffs
Return (R. p. 40), identified the levy and seizure was upon the entire case file, containing all of the
creditor rights-property interests Bergmann held in the case file, Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR1990-12684.
Bergmann took no action in response to the sheriffs Notice of Levy, receiving a copy of the
recording of the Notice of Levy and packet of claim exemption forms, declining to file any objection
or claim (all of which proper notifications were mailed to Bergmann by the sheriff on October 24,
2014 (R. p. 101), as confirmed in the Sheriffs Return (R. pp. 40; 101-102).
Bergmann never appeared at the sale to direct or instmct the sheriff to consider the separation
of any of the creditor rights-property interests that were contained in that single case file, despite the
requirement promulgated by statute that a judgment debtor, if concerned about any proposed
method of the sale, must be present at the sale to direct the sheriff if it be the belief any particular
property interest should be offered for sale separately. The debtor has the obligation to be present
at the sale (I. C. § 11-304), but if any interest is to be sold in a manner other than determined by
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the sheriff, who had determined it best to sell the entire case file content of creditor rights as a
single unit-single lot sale to avoid any confusion, consistent with the Notice of Levy and
advertisement, then the debtor must be present at the sale to direct the sheriff to consider an
alternative manner in conducting the sale.
In the absence of such direction from the debtor, the sheriffs discretion is perceived to be
final under I. C. § 11-304, as the sheriff is authorized to proceed in the manner he believes appropriate,
who was seeking to prevent confusion or conflict within the creditor rights-property interests that had
a series of renewals within the case file, potentially competing and confusing to the public if offered
for sale independently and individually.
Bergmann's case file consisted of "judgments", "orders amending judgment", and "renewed
judgments", each fitting the description of"judgment", with a series ofrenewals without any amounts
within them. The sheriff collectively referred to these creditor interests as "personal property
interests" in both the Levy and Return, and in like manner, those "property interests" where advertised
and noticed for sale as "one unit or lot" within the case file, identified as containing all of "Sharon K.
Smith's property interests within that case, Smith v. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684". Neither
the debtor, nor anyone on Bergmann' s behalf, asked or instructed the sheriff to sell any of the case
file contents separately or independently, and the sheriffs certificate of Sale issued to Puckett
confirmed he acquired all creditor rights-property interests contained within and identified in that case
file, being the successful bidder at that sheriffs sale (R. pp. 41; 99; 103).
The Sheriff's Return confirmed the manner in which the sheriff had levied upon, seized,

advertised, and sold those property interests as the content within that specific case .file.

D.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review in an appeal of this nature is that of abuse of discretion. Any order

to set aside an execution sale is a matter of court discretion. Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 109,
741 P.2d 1289, 1296 (1986); see also Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, Idaho Supreme Court
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Docket No. 44914, June 29, 2018, cited as 421 P.3d 205 (2018).
To determine whether a court has abused its discretion, the reviewing court evaluates
whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with relevant legal standards; and (4)
reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, slip op. 45200 at p. 7
(June 28, 2018).
In this appeal, just as in Safaris Unlimited, supra, Puckett has challenged those elements
concerning the lower court's action being outside the boundaries of its discretion, inconsistent with
the relevant legal standards, and failed to reach a decision based on the law and legal reasoning.
The "general rule" governing a sheriffs sale is that inadequacy of consideration is not
sufficient ground to set aside a sheriffs sale, but "gross inadequacy of consideration, coupled with
very slight additional circumstances is sufficient.", as it has been initially cited in Fed Land Bank of
Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414,425,262 P. 877, 880 (1927).
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in setting aside the sheriff's sale?
2. Did the lower court make a finding of "approximate value" of the
case file contents sold at the sheriff's sale?
3. Did the lower court err in finding "additional circumstances" in the
nature of "irregularity" in the sale process to set aside the sale?

ARGUMENT
1. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in setting aside the sheriff's sale?

The fundamental issue presented in this appeal is whether the lower court abused its discretion
when vacating the sheriffs sale conducted on November 13, 2014. In addressing that issue, the
reviewing court must examine several aspects of the applicable standards that must be considered
when reviewing a sheriffs sale. The reviewing court's initial focus is to determine whether the lower
court made a "reviewable" "finding of fact" as to the "approximate value" of the property interests
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that were sold at the sheriffs sale. Ifthe lower court has failed to make such a reviewable finding, the
order setting aside the sale must be reversed and the matter remanded to the lower court.

If such a "reviewable finding" has been established, then this court will determine if the sale
price was "grossly inadequate", and if deemed to be such, then proceed to determine whether there
exists "additional circumstances", typically found to be within the subject of a statutory violation or
some irregularity in the sale process. These constitute the reviewable elements to be addressed in the
applicable principles and standards to be considered in any Order vacating a sheriffs sale.
In this case, the sheriff, pursuant to his authority under I. C. §11-304, sold all of the case file
contents that held debtor's creditor rights-property interests in Ada County Court case, Smith v. Smith,
Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, selling same as one single bidding lot or unit, as was his discretion,
as the debtor declined to attend the sheriffs sale to direct or instruct the sheriff in any other manner
to sell the case file contents, either in separate lots or as individual Instruments, in the process of
conducting that lawfully undertaken sheriffs sale.

a. The general provisions concerning sheriffs sales
Title 11, Chapter 3, Idaho Code enumerates the requirements governing sheriff sales. See also
Scifaris Unlimited, supra, 421 P.3d 215 SectionD. In Safaris, this court emphasized the requirements

within Title 11, the effect of which seeks to compensate the judgment creditor, while protecting the
judgment debtor from any overreaching.
Title 11 specifically permits the judgment creditor to execute on all non-exempt personal and
real property of the judgment debtor (I.C. § 11-201); it sets forth a notification process (I.C. § 11302); and provides for the manner in which a sheriff's sale is conducted (I.C. § 11-304). See Safaris
Unlimited, supra.

The "general rule" establishes the standard upon which a sheriff's sale is subject to being
vacated, and the principle saying is that mere "inadequacy of consideration" is not a sufficient ground
for setting aside a sheriff's sale, but "gross inadequacy of consideration", coupled with "slight
additional circumstances", is sufficient.
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This appeal brings into issue the application of that principle and those attendant concerns,
and whether those principle standards have been established in this case to justify setting aside this
statutorily conducted sheriffs sale on November 13, 2014.
This court declared in Safaris there must be a determination of "approximate value" of the
property being sold, so the reviewing court may have a finding to determine whether such a factual
finding supports "gross inadequacy of consideration" in the sale price, and ifthere is a factual finding
of "approximate value", and a determination of "gross inadequacy" in the sale price is established,
then the review progresses to determine if there were any "additional circumstances", slight or
otherwise, to impact the process of the sale, typically some failure in statutory compliance with the
execution statutory provisions, or some irregularity in the manner in which the sale was being
conducted. As to this initial and fundamental issue of"approximate value", this court held in Safaris
the following analysis:
Applying the general rule here leads us to vacate the district court's decision
setting aside the sheriff sale ..... we reach this result because the district court
failed to act consistently with relevant standards by not conducting a proper
application of the governing law. The district court specifically failed to make
a sufficient finding as to the approximate value of the Sligar
litigation ....... The district court thus did not make a sufficient finding on the
Sligar litigation's approximate value. This finding was critical, as the
governing law very clearly inquires whether "gross inadequacy of
consideration ... [is] coupled with very slight additional circumstances[.]"
....... Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones 421 P.3rd 205 (2018), Section D, p.
217-219 (Emphasis added).
This court applied the general rule and the established standard on several occasions prior to

Safaris, articulating this subject within the above cited Safaris case, by citing a series of sales and
factual issues where "adequacy" and "circumstances" of a sale were addressed. The court began with
the historical analysis in Fed Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 425, 262 P. 877, 880
(1927), where the general rule was applied to vacate the sale of real property, when the real property
was erroneously subdivided and sold for $300, despite a written bid for $8,700. In Gaskill v. Neal, 77
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Idaho 428, 432, 293 P.2d 957, 960 (1956), the court found the general rule was applied to vacate a
sale of real property when a house and garage, worth $11,000, were separated and sold as two distinct
units for $426.12. In Tudor Engineering Co. v. Mouw, 109 Idaho 573, 575-76, 709 P.2d 146, 148-49

(1985), the court found the general rule was applied to vacate a sale ofreal property, when there was
no notice of the sale, but sold the real property for $385.65 and the real property was thereafter

advertised for sale by the purchaser for $49,000.
In each of those cases, (Curts, Neal, and Tudor, supra), the court determined there was a
"gross inadequacy of consideration" in the sale of the real property, and those sales were coupled
with "additional circumstances," setting forth reasoning that an erroneous division or segregation of
real property, or a failure to comply with statutory requirements, were justification to set the sale
aside.
In Phillips v. Blazier-Hemy, 154 Idaho 724, 729, 302 P.3d 349, 354 (2013), where the court
also cited to Curts, Neal, and Tudor, citing also Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 108-10, 741 P.2d at
1295-97)(1986), Phillips reiterated the general rule, but clarified the principle by confirming that
gross inadequacy of consideration, alone, is not szif.ficient to vacate a sheriff's sale. In Phillips, the

sheriff sold roughly 20 acres of real property for $1,000. The lower court vacated the sale, concluding
the price was so low, as to "shock the judicial conscience," though at the same time, determined there
were no "additional circumstances" or irregularities in the process of the sale to join any gross
inadequate consideration. Id. at 728, 302 P.3d at 353. Thus, the law required the order setting aside
the sale be reversed.
In Sqfaris, the court noted cases where the sale price and circumstances did not provide any

basis to vacate the sheriff's sale, citing initially Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741 P.2d 1289
(1986), where it addressed the sale ofreal property, where the successful bidder bought 800 acres for
$12,000.00, which was subject to a mortgage of $59,000.00, an effective purchase price of
$71,000.00. The real property had been appraised for $680,000.00, but given various factors (water
permit issues, depressed market, rocky outcroppings), a market value of$300,090.00 was considered,
and recognized that all "forced sales commonly produce lower prices.".
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Suchan found the sale price to be "grossly inadequate" but concluded there was no irregularity
in the sale process, stating a critical factual element in these matters that any "misunderstanding of
11
legal rights, though unfortunate, is not an irregularity in the sale itself. Id. at 109, 741 P.2d at 1296.

In Suchan, the complaining party failed to show up at the sale to bid in the judgment amount.

The Suchan court stated the general rule regarding sheriff sales in the following manner:
In general, gross inadequacy of price coupled with irregularities in the sale warrants
vacation. Gaskill v. Neal, 77 Idaho 428, 432, 293 P.2d 957, 960 (1956); The Federal
Land Bank of Spokane v. Curts, 45 Idaho 414,425,262 P. 877,880 (1927). Whether to
set aside an execution sale lies largely within the trial court's discretion. Gaskill, 77
Idaho at 433, 293 P.2d at 960. In both Gaskill and Curts, the sheriff conducting the
execution sale sold the property in parcels rather than as a unit, at the direction of
persons not authorized to direct the manner and order of sale. Each court held this to
be an irregularity in the sale. In the instant case, George, the execution debtor, directed
the order of sale ofparcels under the e..Ypress statutory authority of LC § 11-3 04. In
Gaskill, a house and garage lay partly on each of the two parcels sold. No similar factor
exists in this case. The sheriff in Gaskill and Curts also improperly ignored the highest
bid offered at the sale and instead accepted a much lower bid. This irregularity did not
occur in the instant case, where the sheriff accepted only the highest bid.
In general, parcels not adaptedfor separate and distinct enjoyment should be sold as
a unit However, under I. C. § 11-3 04 if the party directing the order of sale can show
in an intelligible manner the particular way in which the property can be profitably
sold in parcels, the general rule will not apply and the sheriff must follow his
directions. Gaskill, 77 Idaho at 432, 292 P.2d at 960.
Because there was no irregularity in the sale, this court reversed, reaffirming the rule that to
vacate a sheriffs sale, the law requires both grossly inadequate consideration and attendant
"additional circumstances" [irregularities in the sale]. Id. at 728-30, 302 P.3d at 353-55.
As stated in Phillips, this court declined to adopt this "shock the conscience" standard, as to
do so undermined the required presence of"attendant additional circumstances", the missing element
in Phillips and other cases.
Arguments advanced m Phillips; suggesting the expansion of what is "additional
circumstances" were: failure to attend the sale; failure to submit a credit bid; failure to instruct the
sheriff to enter a credit bid; failure to obtain assignment of redemption rights. Those proposed
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"additional circumstances" were unequivocally rejected, as they only served to illustrate both

inattention and misunderstanding of the law, not constituting a statutory non-compliance or some
irregularity in the conduct of the sale process.

Safaris involved a personal property sale, not a real property sale, and concluded that when
applying the general rule and applicable standards, the law required the reversal of that Order vacating
that sheriffs sale because the lower court failed to establish a.finding offact to review a lower court's
determination of "approximate value" of the personal property being sold, as Safaris concluded that

a.finding is necessmy to determine whether there was actually any gross inadequacy ofconsideration.
In our case on appeal, this court is confronted with that initial and fundamental issue as well:
Did the lower court made a factual determination as to the "approximate value" of the contents of the
case file that had been levied upon, advertised, noticed up for sale, and sold by the sheriff on
November 13, 2014? That issue must be addressed by this court before the analysis can advance to
the remaining elements to be applied to these sheriff sales

2. Did the lower court make a finding of "approximate value" of the
case file contents sold at the sheriff's sale?
This appeal, pursuant to the announcements set forth in the Scifaris analysis, require these
party litigants to address this threshold question: Did the lower court make a "finding of fact" as to
the "approximate value" of the case file contents sold at this sheriffs sale?
Though this sequence in analysis of this principle and standard appears to be forefront and
embraced within the Sqfaris decision, could it not also be appropriate to instead proceed with the final
question whether any "additional circumstances (typically statutory non-compliance or irregularity in
the sale process) regarding the proceedings undertaken by the sheriff were present or absent, and if
no qualifying "additional circumstances" are found to exist, the issue of "approximate value" and
"gross inadequacy of consideration" appear to be immaterial to the final outcome of the controversy,
as without the "attendant additional circumstances", a sheriffs sale, irrespective ofthe other elements,
cannot be set aside, made eminently clear in Safaris Unlimited, supra.
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The applicable principles and standards on this subject matter confirm a sheriffs sale cannot
be set aside in the absence of additional circumstances, and absent any additional circumstances in
the nature of a statutory violation or established irregularity in the sale process, the issue of
"approximate value" and "gross inadequacy of sale price" no longer present a concern to the
disposition of the dispute over the validity of the sheriffs sale.
a. The "approximate value" of the case file contents found by the lower court
Given the basis for the reversal in Safaris, this court has establish its preferred sequence of
inquiry in this process when challenging a sheriffs sale. The reversal in Safaris occurred because
there was a lack of factual finding as to "approximate value" of the Sligar litigation that was being
sold by the sheriff at that sale. This court declined to engage in any discussion whether there was
grossly inadequate consideration, as there was no factual finding of any value to review. This court
declined to then address whether there were "additional circumstances" present to even consider, had
there been any gross inadequacy in the sale price. It would appear consistent with the standards to be
applied I these controversies that if the reviewing court found no "additional circumstance" in the
execution-sale process, what's the purpose for any need to have a record of a factual finding of
approximate valuation, when the absence of"additional circumstances" is dispositive?
That said, and accepting the proposition this court has announced in Safaris, Appellant will first
address the lower court's determination on "approximate valuation" of the case file contents sold at
this sheriffs sale. Instead of being "litigation claims and causes of actions", as was the subject matter
in Safaris, in our dispute there are Instruments, in the nature of creditor rights contained in this case
file content.
This court, according to Safaris, will first determine whether our lower court established an
appropriate "reviewable" finding of value of the case file contents to meet this court's satisfaction for
review, and if it be found that the finding is lacking, then the lower court's Order, setting aside the
sheriffs sale, must be reversed, consistent with the holding in Safaris, as the court indicates it cannot,
or will not, review the standards without an approximate value of what was being sold at the sale.
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If the finding, entered by the lower coutt, is determined to be sufficient for review, then it
remains Puckett's position the sale price established by Puckett's credit bid was consistent with, and
in keeping with, the "approximate valuation" that was established by the lower court, as the lower
court made a finding the case file contents (creditor rights) were "not worth very much in the market
value". With that "approximate value" determination, there is no basis to find a "gross inadequacy
in the consideration" as the $100. 00 bid Puckett opened the bidding with is consistent with something
"not worth very much". Absent any gross inadequacy, the lower court's Order must also be reversed,
without need to address any issue as to any "attendant additional circumstances".
The excerpt from our lower court on its "approximate value" and "sale price", states:
Those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value considering that the
judgment debt owed by Vernon (sic) K. Smith remains unpaid after many years. But
their market value, even if much smaller than the judgments' face value, seemingly
cannot be less than zero dollars. Consequently, the effective sale price Sharon Smith
netted at the sheriff's sale-less than zero dollars-is grossly inadequate or, if not
grossly inadequate, at least too low, when considered in combination with the
inadequate property description, to warrant upholding the sale as a valid one.
(Emphasis added) (Memo. Decision Pg. 6-7) (R. pp. 471-472; 568-569; 626-627)
But it did not yield a sizeable bid. Instead, it yielded a credit bid in an amount too
small to even cover the sheriffs fees, which are added to the judgment debt, causing
the total judgment debt to increase, rather than decrease, as a result of the sale of
Sharon Smith's rights in "THAT CERTAIN JUDGMENT." Thus, she received less
than nothing through the sheriff's sale in return/or those rights. (Emphasis added)
(Memo. Decision Pg. 6) (R. pp. 471; 568; 626).
The "approximate value" of the entire case file contents (creditor rights), as determined by
the lower court, was "Those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value", but having
found that valuation, none-the-less determined the sale price,

if not grossly inadequate, at least too

low. That appears to be a rather imprecise assessment of the sale price, when the valuation made it
clear the entire file contents was not worth very much. Notwithstanding that somewhat imperfect
analysis, the lower court then immediately directed its attention to the "sale process", concluding there
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was an "inadequate property description" as to the case file contents the sheriff was selling, despite
the fact the sheriff specifically levied upon, seized and attached "all of Sharon K Smith's personal
property interests in the case of Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684", a single case file,
not two or more files, and all creditor rights within that case file contents were the subject of the sale.
The Notice of Levy described the single case file, and all of the creditor rights-personal
property interests contained within it, and the sheriff advertised the levy and notice of sheriffs sale
as such, being one single case file in which the entire case file contents, being all of the creditor rights-

property interests within it were being sold at the sheriffs sale, never advertising the sale to be of any
one particular instrument within the case file contents, but rather the entire case file contents of
creditor rights-property interests contained in that one specifically identified case file.
All of the Sheriffs notifications, including the sheriffs Return, specifically indicated the fact
the sheriff had levied upon "all ofSharon K Smith's personal property interests in the case ofSmith
vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12 684'', and the entire case file content of such property interests
were to be sold at the sheriff's sale. It was that specifically identified case file, and its entire contents
of creditor rights, that was the subject matter of the property interests sold at that sale, not any one
particular Judgment, Instrument, or multiple case files.
Bergmann was well aware of what was being sold, and if Bergmann had any desire for the
Sheriff to sell any of the creditor right contents within that case file in some independent or made a
separate bid item, then she, as the debtor, according to the statute I. C. §11-304, had the obligation
and responsibility to attend the sale and direct the sheriff to sell what creditor interests within that
entire case contents she felt or believed should be sold separately or independently, as only the
judgment debtor can give that specific instruction, and the sheriff, upon being so notified, must follow
those instructions.
The sheriff has the discretion on those decisions, unless the debtor attends the sale and gives
the direction in some other manner to the sheriff. Otherwise no requirement is imposed on the sheriff,
as he is vested with the discretion to determine in his best judgment how to proceed with the manner
and order of sale, which in this case, the sheriff wanted to remain consistent with both the levy and
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the advertisement in the notice of sheriffs sale, and he was selling all of the creditor rights contained
in that one case file, the one he levied upon and the one he advertised for sale in the sheriffs Notice
of Sheriffs sale.
The sheriff logically perceived the creditor rights-property interests within that entire case file
to reflect a series of creditor rights, somewhat uncertain because of the duplicity of some instruments,
seeing judgments and then renewal judgments, replacing earlier Instruments by the intended purpose
of the renewals, which may have either substituted the original, or merged into another Instrument,
and none of the renewals had any stated amount within them.
The sale had to be consistent with the advertisement, as all of the creditor rights were being
advertised to be sold within the case file content.

b. Is the "approximate value" of the entire case file contents a sufficient finding of fact?
The question this court will address is whether our lower court sufficiently addressed
"approximate valuation" of the entire case file contents, before willing to address "adequacy of the
sale price". If this court concludes the lower court made an insufficient factual finding of value, then
the Order must be reversed, remanded, and the sale upheld, as mandated by Safaris.
In reading the soliloquy expressed by our lower court, it appears to be the concern over the
inclusion of the sheriffs fees to the Puckett Judgment, such that the result was that the Judgment debt
was increased, and from that (despite the $100.00 credit bid from Puckett) the court concluded the
sale price actually realized less than zero.
That "concern", however, is not the "finding of fact" as to the "approximate value" found by
the lower court as to the value of the entire case file contents that was being sold. The "concern" is
over the consequence of the procedural reality sheriff's fees are assessed in these situations, and
though such assessment is added to the unsatisfied judgment remaining, the judgment creditor is
always required to advance those costs. The sheriff's fees are a consequence of the execution process,
not the sale price. Though our lower court may have been shocked by this consequence, especially
when those assessed fees consume the amount of the successful bid, that has nothing to do with the
"value" of the property being sold, and to that point, Phillips rejected any concerns about "shocking"
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attributes in these sale matters, having declined to embrace any "shock the conscience" considerations
whatsoever. Phillips also rejected (as reiterated in Scifaris at 421 P.3d 217) an irrelevant litany of
"perceived" "additional circumstances" as the court concluded a parties' inattention and

misunderstanding of the law is not an additional circumstance. (such as failing to attend the sale to
direct the sheriff as to the manner of the sale) The elements in Phillips was re-affirmed in Safaris.
Our lower court's "finding of fact" on the "approximate value" of the entire case file contents
was expressed as "those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value". Given that
finding, and ifit were to be held to be a sufficient finding, then Puckett's credit bid of$100.00 supports
that lower court's finding, as Puckett concluded the entire case file contents "was not be worth very
much", and the "sale price" was consistent with the lower court's "approximate valuation" of the case
file contents.
Sheriff's fees, being authorized (required) by statute, they are not a function of property value,
nor considered to be a statutory non-compliance or irregularity in the sale process. These assessments
are paid by the judgment creditor, regardless of any effective levy or property sale, and those costs
are added to the unsatisfied judgment, whether the lower court, or anyone else, is offended by that
consequence.
The lower court's concern about fees, and calling the sale price "less than zero" because of
the consequence of these fees, is not a proper component of the standard to be applied in these matters,
and to the point, Puckett's credit bid of $100.00 was not "less than zero", as sheriffs do not accept
zero bids, much less bids "less than zero".
The lower court found an "approximate value" of the entire case file contents, imprecise
as it may be so described, but sufficiently found the case file contents in the nature of creditor
rights-property interests within the case file entitled Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-199012684, had an "approximate value" of being "not worth very much in a market value", and that
valuation fits in between what could be characterized as being more than zero, and "not very
much", such that the credit bid of$100.00 tendered by Puckett, being his opening bid, and soon to
be declared the final offer at the sale, was a bid within the range of the lower court's valuation,

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF -PAGE 22

being not "grossly inadequate", whether too low or not, as there is no other finding made by the
lower court on that issue pertaining to value of the entire case file contents ( creditor rights-property
interests) being sold at that sheriffs sale.
The lower court commented that the sale price was

"if not grossly inadequate, [is] at least

too low". The lower court here appears to distinguish between being "too low" and being "grossly

inadequate", so did this lower court even make a determination the sale price was grossly
inadequate? If not grossly inadequate, is there any need to then consider "attendant additional
circumstances"? Did the court conclude the price was "too low" or "grossly inadequate"?
This uncertain and rather confusing analysis the consequence of the sheriffs fees assessed
in these execution proceedings.
Our lower court did not have the guidance announced in Safaris to use as its backdrop, but
given what finding has been made by our lower court, setting aside the sheriff's sale is not
supported by any of the language contained in the execution statutes, and there is no factual basis
to conclude the sheriff had any obligation or duty to separate out the case file contents and sell
separately any judgment Instrument, when the sheriff had levied upon, advertised, noticed for sale,
and effectively sold the entire case file contents, being all creditor rights-property interests
identified within that one single case file. The sheriff was selling all creditor rights contained in
one single case file, never proposing to sell, not instructed to sell, any one individual instrument
separate from another Instrument contained within that one specifically identified case file.
The lower court has cited no case law to support any of its position by any factual
comparison, and its finding of value, as imprecise as it may serve to be, represents a finding of an
"approximate value" of the entire case file contents in a colloquial fashion, confirming these
"property interests" are such that "those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value",
and absent a specific criteria to require more specificity within the determination of value, that
determination may suffice, as Safaris has not announced a more precise requirement of valuation to
be ascertained.
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This court must now undertake to determine whether that "finding of fact" is a sufficient finding
for judicial review. If it is, then Puckett does submit that his credit bid of $100.00 was very much
consistent and in line with what the lower court's assessed valuation of the entire case file contents to
be "not worth very much in a market value", and the public gathering confirmed the bidding interest
was consistent with that approximate value, as no one saw the worth to be in excess of that.

If that finding "those rights might not be worth very much in a market-value" is seen to be
a little imprecise to constitute a factual determination of value to be "reviewed" by this court, then the
lower court's Order must be reversed, as in Safaris, and the validity of the sheriffs sale fully
reinstated.
c. What did the public see to be an "approximate value" of the case file contents?

Had anyone at the sale saw any value in the entire case file contents to justify bidding higher
than what Puckett tendered as his opening bid, it would have garnered further bidding, so the
perception of the bidding public supports the lower court's finding Bergmann' s creditor rights,
identified and contained in that one specifically identified case file, were "not worth very much".
The knowledgeable public, reviewing the entire contents ofthe Smith v. Smith case file, would
reasonably conclude the "creditor rights-property interests" stemmed from an old disputed divorce
proceeding spanning three decades ago, with creditor rights lying dormant for decades, potentially
uncollectable, and possibly unenforceable, with no activity for nearly a quarter century, seeing a 1991
judgment that was never renewed in the renewal cycle of 1996, Bergmann failing to provide a
"renewed judgment" despite being directed on November 5, 1996 to do so, and seeing a 1999
Judgment that in subsequent years was not even eligible for renewal in prior years, along with
renewals with no figures or amounts, left much to be desired as a value asset. The general public
would be skeptical at placing any value beyond even what the lower court did ("not very much") just
as Puckett concluded and did, and prudence dictated that the entire case file contents would best be
sold as one single case file unit or lot, just as the sheriff so concluded, absent any attendance of the
debtor or her representative, and absent any specific direction from the debtor to the contrary.
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The entire case file contents was made transparent and recorded as a public disclosure with
reference to the entire case file contents within Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684,
identified within the Notice of Levy, which was recorded, and was fully disclosed and identified in
the publications, the advertisements, the posted notices and in the announcement at the publicly held
Sheriffs Sale on November 13, 2014.
Appellant would suggest to this court, regardless the issue of "approximate valuation" to
reverse the Order of the lower court upon the conclusion there was no additional circumstance
recognized by this court that would constitute any violation of the execution statutes or any
irregularity in the sale process, as the lower court did not find any violation of the execution process,
the levy process, the advertisement process, or the notification of the sale process; rather only
expressed concern because it concluded there were two separate original judgments contained within
the identified single case file, and the lower court felt those two judgments could better be sold
separately, despite the fact the sheriff has that discretion, not the court, and the sheriff was selling the
entire file contents of that case, not any single judgment instrument.
The sheriff sold the file contents as he so levied upon it, as he had so advertised the entire case
file contents, as he had so noticed the case file contents for sale, and conducted the sale in that manner.
This constitutes the only concern relied upon by the lower court to conclude "irregularity" in the sale
process, and neither the statute nor case law says the sheriff did anything improper or unlawful.

3. Did the lower court err in finding "additional circumstances" in the
nature of "irregularity" in the sale process to set aside the sale?
There has been no showing by the lower court the sheriff has improperly levied upon the
debtor's personal property, or did not properly advertise the property interests as he did, nor any
showing that the notice of the sale was in any way improper, or that the sheriff had an obligation to
sell separately any instrument within the entire case file contents that was the subject of the sale.
All of the creditor rights-property interests of Bergmann in that entire case file was levied
upon within that one specifically identified case file, and it was that one case file, containing all
creditor rights-property interests that was to be sold, and was advertised as being sold as a single unit
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or lot, as the entire case file contents of that one case file was seized, advertised, noticed for sale and
offered for sale to the bidding public. Nothing done by the sheriff at the sheriffs ale was in any way
inconsistent with the way in which the case file was levied upon, seized, advertised, and noticed to be
sold at the sheriffs sale.
The lower court has identified no "statutory" violation in the manner in which the entire case
file contents, containing the creditor rights-property interests of Sharon K. Smith (Bergmann) were
improperly or inadequately sold at the sheriffs sale, as the entire case file contents was sold pursuant
to the execution statutes, pursuant to discretion of the sheriff, absent any instruction from the debtor.
The conclusion by the lower court there was "irregularity in the sale process" is the flawed
belief that the sheriff had a duty or obligation to reach into the case file contents and select each
individual Instrument, and sell them separately, and that by not selling what the court believed to be
at least two identifiable and different judgments from within the entire contents of that case file, the
sheriff committed some irregularity in the sale process.
The lower court has identified no statutory basis or case authority to support its conclusion, and
the lower court cannot disregard the statutory provisions that place with the sheriff the discretion to
sell "property interests" in the manner he selects, absent a direction or instruction from the judgment
debtor. (See I. C. §11-304).
The process conducted by the sheriff was in accordance with the statute and authority vested
in the Sheriff. In Safaris, the court recited the execution/sale statutes, by stating:
Title 11 permits the judgment creditor to execute on all non-exempt personal and
real property of the iudgment debtor, I.C. § 11-201 (Emphasis added).
I. C. §11-301 is similarly expansive and states in relevant part:
The sheriff must execute the writ against the property of the judgment debtor by
levying on a sufficient amount of property if there be sufficient; collecting or
selling the things in action, and selling the other property, and paying to the
plaintiff or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment.
(Emphasis added)
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The "property interests" the sheriff levied upon, seized, advertised, and sold in Safaris
Unlimited was described to be all of the rights and interests of Michael Von Jones, who was identified

as the Plaintiff in the pending action levied upon, and those "rights and interests" were identified as
follows:
" .... without limitation, all right, title, claim. and interest of Defendant Mike Von
Jones in and to all claims. demands. damages. debts, liabilities, accounts,
reckonings, obligations, bonds, guarantees, warranties, costs, e.Ypenses, losses,
liens, actions, and causes of action of each and every kind, nature and
description, whether now known or unknown. suspected or unsuspected, which
Jones might have, own, or lwld, or at any time heretofore ever had, owned, or
held against Jeremy Sligar and/or Overtime Garage, LLC, including, without
limitation, those claims that are the subiect of the lawsuit ofMike Jones v. Jeremy
Sligar and Overtime Garage, LLC; Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-16-1554,
None of the "rights and interests" of Mr. Jones were divided up or sold separately when
sold at the sheriffs sale. It remains a fact this Court never proceeded to address whether there were
any "additional circumstances" in that case to consider if the sheriff had to sell any of those "rights
and interests", contained and identified in that litigation file, separately, absent a direction from
the judgment debtor, as this court reversed the order vacating the sheriffs sale, due to a failure in
the finding regarding the approximate value of the "rights and interests" of the litigation.
In Safaris, the sheriff's sale was conducted as scheduled, and was selling what was
advertised: all of the rights and interests of that Defendant in that specifically identified case filing,
and Safaris Unlimited, the only bidder in attendance at the sale, purchased all of those rights and
interests as contained in that one identified case file entitled Mike Jones v. Jeremy Sligar and
Overtime Garage, LLC; Twin Falls County Case No. CV42-16-1554.

Quite consistent with the manner in which this Bergmann execution and sale was
conducted. The creditor rights in our case were also identified and contained in one case file, not
a series of case files. The judgment creditor in Safaris tendered a credit bid, and the bidding ended,
rendering the creditor the successful bidder, just as with Puckett. The record indicates Michael
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Jones, the judgment debtor, did not attend the sale, just as with this judgment debtor, Bergmann,
and we also find that Jones, just like Bergmann, later moved to set aside the sale, which the lower
court set aside.
On appeal in Safaris, this Court reversed, holding the lower court presented no factual
finding relating to the approximate valuation of the "Sligar litigation", being the value of the
property within case file.
This Court noted that whether a lower court has abused its discretion, an Appellate Court
must determine whether the district court: ..... (3) acted consistently with relevant legal standards.
This court concluded the lower court in Safaris failed to act consistently with relevant
standards, and had not conducted a proper application of the governing law. (Safaris Unlimited,

Supra, 421 P.3d at 217) The lower court failed to make a sufficient finding as to any value of the
worth of the Sligar litigation. The record indicates the lower court made remarks, in that:
"[i]t may be that Mr. Sligar owes Mr. Jones some money, it may be that Mr. Jones
owes Mr. Sligar some money, it may be that neither one of them owes anybody any
money. Who knows?"
It remains difficult to criticize that lower court as to its inability to place any value on what
truly is an unknown factor to the court, and arguably even to the litigating parties, as that may well
be the basis of their controversy. Realistically, there is much to appreciate by the analysis given
by the court in Citizens National Bank v. Dixieland Forest Products, LLC, 935 So.2d 1004, 1010
(Miss. 2006), which undertook to explain that "[a]s with any other personal property, a chose in
action's value- for purposes of levy and execution- is determined at a sheriffs execution sale."
This court has taken the position that a finding of' approximate value" is to be articulated

either on the record or in writing, based on preponderance of evidence found of record, and that
first step remains critical as what remains an element of the governing law, which requires gross
inadequacy of consideration ... coupled with additional circumstances, announced in Curts, 45
Idaho at 425, 262 P. at 880 (1927); Gaskill, 77 Idaho at 432-33, 293 P.2d at 960 (1956); Tudor,
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109Idahoat575-76, 709P.2dat 148-49(1985);Suchan, 113 Idaho 102,109,741 P.2d 1289, 1296
(1986), and Phillips, 154 Idaho at 727-30, 302 P.3d at 352-55 (2013).
Safaris appears to hold for the proposition absent "an approximate value", it leaves the
court unable to conduct appellate review of that element, as there are no facts on appeal to review,
before going to the remaining issues in the analysis. See also Frontier Dev. G1p., LLC v. Caravella,
157 Idaho 589, 595, 338 P.3d 1193, 1199 (2014).

a. Was there any "irregularity" or "additional circumstance" in this sale process?
The lower court concluded "irregularity" in the Sheriffs Sale, based upon the reasoning the
lower court saw two judgments among the series of Instruments and renewals contained within the
entire case file contents within Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, and for that reason,
the lower court concluded the sheriff had an obligation to present the two judgments separately, and
the sheriff did not declare which one, of the two judgments, he was selling at the sheriffs sale. The
flaw in that reasoning is that the sheriff was not selling any single judgment; the sheriff was selling
the entire case file contents, being all of Bergmann 's ''personal property interests" found within the
case file, Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, and those creditor rights-property interests

were being sold as one unit or lot, consistent with the authority granted to the sheriff in the Idaho's
Execution Statutes. The Sheriff followed the discretion allowed to him within the requirements of the
statutory law, and there is no case law in Idaho to impose upon the sheriff a duty to do otherwise.
If the debtor (Bergmann) wanted any of her creditor rights-property interests to be somehow
separated out and sold independently, it was incumbent upon her to attend the sheriffs sale and direct
the sheriff to sell the contents of the entire case file in some manner other than the way in which the
case file was seized, advertised, noticed for sale and was then slated to be sold to the public as a single
case file unit or lot.
Bergmann did not attend the sale, and if she failed to do so because she misunderstood the
law, that does not convert to the imposition of an obligation on the sheriff to read her mind and to do

what she fails herself to undertake to do. Bergmann, herself, or an authorized agent, has to attend the
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sale and instruct the sheriff as to her concerns. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained the
proposition that any misunderstanding of the law does not provide any irregularity of the sale or

create any additional circumstance to consider, as cited hereinbefore. Bergmann held those creditor
rights-property interests identified and contained within the case file, Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CVDR-1990-12684, and she was well aware the entire case file contents was levied upon, attached,
seized, advertised, and noticed for a sheriffs sale, and Bergmann failed to either object to the manner
of sale of the property interests scheduled to be sold, or attend the sale to protect those interests to be
sold, and in those situations, there will not be a sympathetic ear in the appellate courts. See Phillips

v. Blazier-Henry, supra, where the court made the relevant observation that "Chance failed to
protect her own interests by submitting a credit bid or attending the sale ... " 154 Idaho at 730,
302 P.3d at 355, and further observed that one, "who fails to protect its interests in the sale might
not find a sympathetic ear in the courts." 154 Idaho at 729, 302 P.3d at 354.
Bergmann makes the flawed attempt to suggest to the lower court she did not know what
(subject matter) was being sold at the Sheriffs Sale. That's rather interesting, as she failed to attend
the sale, but had she been there, she would have heard the sheriff announce he was selling all of the
creditor rights-property interests identified and contained within that specifically identified case file.
The lower court did not find any basis to attack the execution, the levy, the advertisement, or the
notice of sale, only concerned as to the conduct of the sale itself, wanting the contents sold separately.
The process of scheduling a Sheriffs Sale is established by Statute, Title 11, Chapter 1,
concerning executions, and Chapter 3, concerning Levy and Sale under Execution. The Statute
governing Levy and Sale under Execution, I. C. § 11-302, relates to personal property, which is not
perishable, wherein subpart two controls, which provides as follows:
"In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice (meaning a written
notice of the time and place of the sale) in three (3) public places in the precinct or
city where the sale is to take place for not less than five (5) nor more than ten (10)
days before the time set for the sale, or by publishing a copy thereof at least one (1)
week, and not more than two (2) weeks, in a newspaper published in the county, if
there be one."
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The Notice of Sale has never been challenged, as the record was clear that notice was posted
at three locations on November 6, 2014, being no less than five (5) nor more than ten (10) days from
the scheduled sale ofNovember 13, 2014. There has been no finding of any irregularity in the posting
of Notice of this Sale. The Writ of Execution was processed by the Ada County Sheriffs office by
serving the Writ and Levy of the judgment upon the property interests of Sharon K. Smith (Bergmann)
upon in the Fourth District Court of Ada County, where judgment creditor's interests were held, as
the personal property interests of Sharon K. Smith (Bergmann) were located in Ada County, with the
Ada County clerk. There has been no finding of any irregularity in the execution or levy process.
All of those property interests (those rights, titles, claims, and interests contained in that
specifically identified case file, Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684) were attached and
levied upon by the Ada County Sheriff, and he confirmed that procedural process in two ways: the
Sheriff served a Recorded copy of the Writ of Execution and a recorded copy of the Notice of Levy
upon the Clerk of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County, Idaho, at the Ada County
Courthouse, 200 West Front St., Boise, ID, 83702, by personally serving a copy of the Recorded Writ
of Execution and recorded Notice of Levy upon Chelsea Carattini, a court clerk, where the rights,
titles, claims and interests of Sharon K. Smith (Bergmann) were located and identified within that one
specific case file and one specific case number, and furthermore, the Sheriff served a Recorded copy
of the Writ of R1Cecution and a recorded copy of the Notice of Levy, together with the Exemption
Claim forms, upon Sharon K Smith at her resident address in Nampa, Idaho, being the judgment
debtor actually claiming ownership of the case file attached and levied upon by the Ada County
Sheriff. Sharon K Smith (Bergmann) not only received that formal notice through the Sheriffs
office, but also provided a copy ofthe Writ ofR1Cecution, and reference to the Notice ofLevy, along
with a copy of the Letter of Instruction on October 10, 2014, to her attorney, and on October 14,
2014, Bergmann received that complete packet of documentation from her attorney.
That pursuant to Title 11 Chapter 2, I. C. § 11-203:
"The defendant or the defendant's representative is to complete the claim of
exemption form as provided to them by the Sheriffs department."
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Bergmann declined to complete, execute or submit any of the Claim of Exemption forms, as
no exemption would apply. Those claim forms were provided to her through I. C. §8-507(C). At that
period of time, I. C. §8-507(c) declares that §8-507(A) through §8-507(D) shall apply to Levy of
Execution, pursuant to Chapters 2 and 3, Title 11. See I. C. §8-507(c).
Pursuant to I. C. §8-507(A):
"The service on a defendant by the Sheriff shall be service by mail to the defendant
to the last known mailing address of the defendant as provided by the plaintiff in
the written directions. and the Sheriff shall indicate on the return ofthe writ filed with
the court the date and manner of service upon the defendant, and any third party, and
shall indicate the document served."
That current address was provided to the sheriff, and the submittals were completed.

The Notice to Sharon K Smith (Bergmann) did provide to her the enclosed Writ of
Execution, the enclosed Notice ofLevy, setting forth the fact the Sheriff had levied upon all of the
case file contents, her personal property, and the enclosed CTaim of Exemption forms, and the
defendant had 14 days after the date ofthe mailing ofthese documents to file a Claim ofR'\:emption
with the Sheriff's office.
All statutory requirements were met with full and complete compliance, as the Writ of
Execution, Notice of Levy, Notice of Sheriff's Sale, and the Claim of Exemption forms were mailed
to the last known address of Sharon K. Smith (Bergmann) at her home address in Nampa, Idaho, as
contemplated by all provisions of §8-507, §8-507(A), §8-507(B), §8-507(C), §8-507(D), and Title
11, Chapters 2 and 3, Statutes of the State of Idaho. The lower court has found no "additional
circumstance" or any "irregularity" in any of that statutory process.

I. C. § 11-304 allows a judgment debtor to be present at a scheduled sheriffs sale, to advance
any concerns or preference in any manner ofthe sale process, no debtor is required to be in attendance,
and the debtor's failure to attend constitutes a waiver of any matters that could have been raised during
the sale process. . If the judgment debtor elects to be present at the sale, that debtor has the authority
to direct the order in which the property, real or personal, is to be sold, when such property consists

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF - PAGE 32

of several known lots or parcels or of articles which can be sold to advantage separatery, and the
Sheriff is obligated to follow the instructions. It remains an argument whether this sale consisted of
anything that needed to be or should be sold separately, as it was the entire case file contents that was
being sold, as advertised, not individual Instruments. Had the debtor appeared at the sale and
participated, that issue could have been addressed and resolved-to the satisfaction of the debtor.
There were not thought to be "several known lots or parcels or of articles" that were
independently seized in this execution process, as there was but one case file that was the subject
matter ofthis et:ecution and sale process, which contained all of the creditor rights-property interests
of the debtor, and it was that single case file that contained the rights, titles, and interests of Bergmann,
and were susceptible to being sold as a single unit or lot sale, just as was the sale conducted in the
Safaris case.
Bergmann suggests she did not know which of her judgments or renewed judgments were
being sold; notwithstanding the fact that she knew all of her rights, titles, and interests, as a judgment
creditor in Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, was levied upon and were to be sold as within that
specifically identified case file, and_having failed to attend the sale, her expression that she was
uncertain as to which article or parcel was about to be sold is most disingenuous, as there was only
one case file, not multiple files levied upon and all interests in that case file was advertised to be sold,
and that is what she knew had been levied upon, receiving the writ, notice of levy and claim forms.
When Bergmann failed to make her appearance at the sale, and failed to even attempt to
instruct the sheriff of any ( now claimed) desire to separate out any aspect of the case file contents, she
has waived any claim there was any jeopardy or loss as a result of selling the contents of that case file
as one unit or lot, as that was where "all" of her creditor rights-property interests were contained, and
she has no standing to challenge the process of that sale under any theory of a single unit-one lot sale,
as all interests, confusing and overlapping as they were, were all contained in that one case file that
was being sold as a single unit for one sum of money.
This Court must enforce the statute as it is written, and cannot create a burden upon a Sheriff
to dismantle a single case file and sell component items from within it, when it was levied upon,
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seized, advertised, and noticed for sale as a case file containing all rights, titles, and interests of Sharon

K. Smith (Bergmann), in Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, the composite of contents within the case
file being the subject of the sale.
The lower Court focused upon the phrase, "that certain judgment," being used within the
Letter of Instruction, saying it was singular rather than plural, because of which the court raised
the question of possible ambiguity as to whether only one, or both judgments, arising out of the
scope of the referenced civil proceeding, was seized and sold pursuant to the writ of execution.
It was all property interests identified and contained within the one specifically identified

case file contents that the sheriff levied upon, advertised, and noticed for sale, which included all
creditor rights-property interests within that one specifically identified case file. Nothing found
within Idaho's execution statutes require a judgment creditor to first inventory, and then precisely
identify personal property that the sheriff has the authority to levy upon and sell at a sheriff's sale.
Because the entirety of the property interests levied upon, as arising out of the civil
proceeding Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684, consisted of judgments and renewal
Instruments, there simply is no identifiable Idaho legal authority to support the lower court's action
in setting aside the sheriffs sale on the basis the case file contents had to be sold independently
and separately, absent any direction or instruction from the judgment debtor.
The lower court erroneously determined: (1) there was an inadequate property description,
coupled with (2) inadequate consideration paid for the property (actually in its final analysis, the
price was said to be "too low", if not grossly inadequate), and upon that basis, set aside the sheriffs
sale. Memo. Decision at pg. 7 (R. p. 472; 569; 627).
In the lower court's first sentence under the heading "Analysis" the lower court stated the
primary basis for its determination the personal property sold had not been adequately described
or identified is expressed in this manner:
When a judgment creditor wants to have personal property of the judgment debtor
sold in execution on the judgment, the judgment creditor must give the county
sheriff instructions identifying the property to be levied upon and sold. See I. C. §
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1
8-507(a) .... Memorandum Decision at pg. 5 (R. p. 470; 567; 625).

A court's decision to set aside a sheriffs sale constitutes an exercise of discretion. Phillips

v. Blazier-Hemy, 154 Idaho 724, 727, 302 P.3d 349, 352 (2013). The challenge made under that
standard by Puckett arises under the second prong of the abuse of discretion analysis involving a
court's reliance upon an erroneous legal standard. Reliance upon an erroneous legal standard was
the same ground cited in Phillips v. Blazier-Henry. 154 Idaho at 730, 302 P.3d at 355. The lower
court, in reaching its decision to set aside the sheriffs sale, stating the property description was
inadequate, did not act consistently with the legal standards specifically applicable to that
determination, as provided by Idaho's judgment execution statutes, giving rise to the question:
Is a judgment creditor statutorily required to provide the county sheriff with
instructions that specifically and exactly identify the property he is to levy upon
and sell, when that judgment creditor has generically identified a case file and a
"judgment," interest within it, wanting all personal property owned by the judgment
debtor in that case file sold in satisfaction of the levy against the case file?

d. There is no statutory "particularity" requirement concerning identification of
personal property seized and to be sold under a writ of execution
The only "particularity" requirement that is stated within Idaho's execution statutes is that
which only applies to real property, as stated in I. C. §11-302(3). "In case of real property, by
posting a similar notice particularly describing the property ... " Even with that particularity as only applicable to real property - Idaho's statutory law remains clear, when either the real or
personal property consists of multiple lots, parcels, or articles, an exercise of discretion exists as
In 2017 the Idaho Legislature repealed I.C. §§ 8-507 through 8-523 and reenacted
substantially similar provisions at I.C. §§ 11-701 et seq. See, 2017 Ida.Sess.L. ch. 303, pg. 799,
§§ 2, 3 (pg. 800), & § 9 (pp. 803-813). No provision was made for any retroactive application of
these 2017 amendments, which went into effect July 1, 2017. I.C. § 67-510. Therefore, the review
of this Order should be governed by the law that was in effect at the time the original motion to
set aside the sheriffs sale was made in 2015. See e.g., Alexander v. Harcon, Inc., 133 Idaho 785,
788, 992 P.2d 780, 783 (2000); and State v. Hiatt, 162 Idaho 726, 728, 404 P.3d 668, 670
(Ct.App.2017).
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to the order of sale, as declared in the last sentence ofl. C. §11-304: "The judgment debtor, if
present at the sale, may also direct the order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold, when
such property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be sold to
advantage separately, and the sheriff must follow such directions."
In this case, the lower court itself identified the undisputed fact that the writ of execution,
as issued, encompassed both judgments within the identified case to which that writ of execution
applied. The Court declared that the judgment creditor's directive was, "unclear because two
distinct money judgments were entered in her [Sharon's] favor in that case and were never
consolidated into a single money judgment. The Court sees no way to interpret that singular
phrasing as encompassing both money judgments." See, Memo. Decision at pg. 6 (bracketed
reference added) (R. p. 471; 568; 626). Then declaring, "The uncertainty created by the singular
phrasing, along with the failure to specify a particular judgment date or amount (or two judgment
dates or amounts), undermined the sale process." Memo. Decision at pg. 6 (R. p. 471; 568; 626).
This conclusion is not supported by Idaho's execution statutes. Phillips v. Blazier-Henry,
154 Idaho at 729,302 P.3d at 354 ("This Court's decisions have set out a consistent and appropriate
standard to apply in cases seeking to set aside a sheriffs sale conducted under Idaho's execution
statutes.").
The question whether the lower court's reason and conclusion for setting aside the sheriffs
sale is whether it is supported by the actual requirements established within Idaho's execution
statutes.

The statute the lower court primarily relied was I.C. §8-507(a)(2). This statute is

incorporated by reference, as applied to a levy upon personal property, by the express language
found in I. C. §11-301. Section 8-507(a) lists documents the sheriff must serve upon a person or
corporation in possession of property that is subject to the levy.

All that I. C. §8-507(a)(2)

expressly requires is he service of a notice that the identified object - here, the specifically
identified case file in which there are property interests in the form of creditor rights - is being
"attached in pursuance of such writ." That statute does not require the judgment creditor to
inventory what a judgment debtor's personal property interests are, or ascertain any specific

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF-PAGE 36

identification of that personal property. It is seen to be what is contained within that specifically
identified case file.
That statute does not expressly require any of the additional identifying information upon
which the lower court relied in setting aside the sheriffs sale. There is no requirement found in I.
C. §8-507(a)(2) that a judgment(s) date or judgment(s) amount is to be ascertained, as it is clearly

ascertainable by what is identified and contained within the specifically identified case file.
There is no requirement that multiple judgments first must be consolidated into a single
judgment so as to permit a single case file, or the contents of that file, to be levied upon. Here, the
case number of the civil proceeding was identified as encompassing the judgments (creditor
interests) that were contained within the case file that was being levied upon. I. C. § 11-301, itself,
addresses the lower court's concerns as to how a general levy upon personal property of a judgment
debtor is to be carried out:

11-301. Execution of writ. - The sheriff must execute the writ against the
property of the judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of property if
there be sufficient; collecting or selling the things in action, and selling the other
property, and paying to the plaintiff or his attorney so much of the proceeds as will
satisfy the judgment. Any excess in the proceeds over the judgment and accruing
costs must be returned to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the
judgment or order of the court. When there is more property of the judgment debtor
than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs within the view of the
sheriff, he must levy only on such part of the property as the judgment debtor may
indicate, if the property indicated be amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
costs.
[The final paragraph of this statute now refers to I. C. §§11-703, 11-706,
11-707, 11-709 and 11-710, instead of the now-repealed I. C. §§8-507 through 8507D, which were formerly referenced in this paragraph. See, footnote 1 above]
(bracketed reference to omitted material added).
In Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 729, 302 P.3d 349, 354 (2013) the mere
payment of what is deemed to be inadequate consideration at a sheriffs sale does not - standing
alone - justify setting aside that sheriffs sale. So, in the absence of some evidence supporting the
existence of some irregularity in the sheriffs sale, one that is recognized within Idaho law, none
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of which Appellant has seen to apply to this sale, is there any need to inquire further into the
adequacy of consideration, when absent any additional circumstances, the sale is not subject to
being set aside?
The lower court has not identified the basis from which to impose any legal obligation
upon the sheriff to require him to sell the contents of a case file separately. Instead, the sheriff is
entitled to conduct the sale as a single unit as authorized by I. C. § 11-304. Absent any instruction
provided by the Judgment Debtor at the time of the sale, directing the sheriff to sell those personal
property interests separately, the sheriff acted properly and within his statutory authority. The
operative language ofl. C. § 11-304 provides:
The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the order in which
property, real or personal, shall be sold, when such property consists of several
known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and
the sheriff must follow such directions. (Emphasis added).
I. C. §8-507(a)(2) does not support the existence of any legal standard the lower court has

decided to

set

aside the

sheriffs

sale.

Idaho's

execution

statutes provide for

a

compartmentalization of property executed upon, to the extent that property is either real or
personal, which characterization is consistent with general principles ofldaho property law. See,
I. C. §§55-101 & 55-102. Not only does I. C. §8-507(a)(2) not require the specificity in identifying

the property executed upon that this Court has implied - including any date or amount of any
instrument representing a creditor right within the specifically identified case file, but the lower
court's interpretation of that statute is in direct conflict with scope of personal property subject to
execution, as declared in I. C. §11-201, and in conflict with the discretion granted to the sheriff by
I. C. §§11-301 & 11-304 to both marshal, and then to sell, such non-exempt personal property of

the debtor as is necessary to satisfy the writ of execution. See generally, Worley Highway Dist. v.

Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833, 835, 663 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Ct.App.1983) ("It is a cardinal
principle of statutory construction that where possible to do so courts must harmonize and
reconcile statutes which apparently conflict.").
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The lower court has abused its discretion in setting aside the sheriffs sale as based upon
an alleged legal standard not supported by the express language ofldaho's execution statutes. The
lower court's order setting aside the sheriff's sale must be vacated and the sheriffs sale fully
reinstated.
e.

No established "irregularities" exist within the Execution proceedings and
November 13, 2014 Sheriff's Sale which would justify setting the sale aside

The lower court found no other basis to set aside the sheriffs sale, beyond what has been
addressed above. The sheriff was presented with a writ of execution issued against a specifically
identified case file, and referencing a "certain judgment" known to be found within that
specifically identified case file, in which it remains undisputed there were a series of Instruments
found within that case file. No argument has been raised that either of the two "original"
judgments, as entered within that specifically identified case file, were not equally susceptible to
being levied upon within the scope of the property interests identified by the writ. On this question,

I. C. §11-201 sets the benchmark standard that, "All goods, chattels, moneys and other property,
both real and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law or by
court order. and all property and rights of property, seized and held under attachment in the action,
are liable to execution." (Emphasis added).
Every creditor right-property interest, as arising out of that specifically identified case file,
was an interest encompassed by the writ of execution, and none of the creditor rights contained
therein were exempt from execution "by law or court order." Consequently, there was no legal
impediment under that writ of execution to prohibit the sheriff from exercising his discretion to
levy against all of those creditor rights-property interests as contained within that specifically
identified case file, just as his Notice of Levy and Notice of Sheriff's sale so disclosed that he had
done. All creditor rights-property interests, including what the lower court has called "two
judgments", were levied upon, seized, noticed for sale and sold as being within the case file
contents of what was specifically identified as the target case file, levied upon as a single unit
advertised as such, and slated to be sold as such as being property interests within a specifically
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identified single case file.
In light of these statutory standards, exactly how does this particular matter present a
different situation than as does typically arise out of a general execution made upon personal
property of a debtor, in which the sheriff has the discretion granted under I. C. §§11-301 & 304 to
sell any amount of personal property necessary to satisfy a levy? As a typical example, I. C. § 11605(3) provides an exemption for one motor vehicle, up to a value of $7,000.00. If a writ of
execution identified the generic class to attach as referring to "motor vehicle" (in the singular),
would that designation preclude the ability of the sheriff, as authorized by statute, to execute
against multiple motor vehicles titled to the judgment debtor, that is found to be in excess of the
statutory exemption?
Unless exempt by law or court order, all personal property of a judgment debtor is
susceptible to levy under writ of execution. Any imprecise identify by class or number of the nonexempt property that is otherwise subject to execution does not constitute an irregularity in any
aspect of the execution process, and our lower court has not taken any issue with this aspect of the
law.
In this case, there it one case file and all of its contents that was being levied upon,
advertised, noticed for sale, and to be sold, and if Bergmann wanted any of that process to be
addressed differently, she needed speak out and attend the sale. Her misunderstanding of the law

is not an irregularUy in the sale process, and her failure to attend will not be allowed to be a basis
to set the sale aside. Phillips v. Blazier-Hemy, supra, summarized the applicable analysis:
This Court has not previously held that gross inadequacy of price, standing alone,
provides grounds for setting aside a sheriffs sale. Our decisions have uniformly
held that there must be some irregularity in the sale or other slight additional
circumstance. There was no slight additional circumstance in this case that
weighed in favor of setting the sale aside. 154 Idaho at 730, 302 P.3d at 355
(emphasis added).
The sheriff is unconditionally protected by the language in the statute, and the sheriffs
office conducted the sheriffs sale in accordance with the execution statutes, and the lower court
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cannot disregard the sheriffs discretionary right to sell property interests in question as a single
unit or lot rather than dig into a twenty-five year old case file and sell independently and separately
various creditor rights-property interests that may be conflicting, confusing, and somewhat
uncertain, and for that very reason, there bidding public is told they assume any risk, as the sale is
without any warranty or guarantee as to the nature of the interest being acquired through that sale,
especially given the overlap and confusion, as expressed previously. The sheriff confirmed he had
executed upon all of the property interests ofBergmann as described within the Sheriffs Return:
I received the Writ of Execution on October 9, 2014, and pursuant to said
1.)
Writ and Instructions from Plaintiff on October 23, 2014, I served a copy thereof
with Notice of Levy upon the Ada County Recorder through Gail Garrett, 200 W.
Front St., Boise, ID 83702, by recording said documents as Instrument No. 2014086335 and Instrument No. 2014-086336, AND DID LEVY UPON THE
PERSONAL PROPERTY INTERESTS presently claimed by said Sharon K.
Smith, as judgment creditor, she holds wherein she is identified and named as the
Plaintiff therein, and her former husband, Vernon K. Smith, is named and identified
as the Defendant therein, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684 and that I Noticed the
property for Sheriffs Sale scheduled on November 13, 2014.
That pursuant to Instructions from said Plaintiff on October 23, 2014, I did
2.)
also serve a copy of those recorded documents upon the Ada County Fourth District
Court, through Chelsea Caratinni, Deputy Clerk at 200 W. Front St., Boise, ID
83702.
That copies of the attached recorded documents, with Claim ofExemption
3.)
form were mailed to the Defendant on October 24, 2014, at the following address:
Sharon K. Smith, 13724 Morning Side St., Nampa, ID, 83651-5091.
That on November 6, 2014, Sheriff Sale Notices were posted at the
4.)
following locations: Public Safety Building lobby at 7200 Barrister Dr., Boise, ID
83704; Albertson's lobby at 1520 Cole Rd. Boise, ID 83704; and Fred Meyer's
lobby at 5230 W. Franklin Rd., Boise, ID 83705.
That I attended at the time and place of said Sale and sold the
5.)
PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED PERSONAL PROPERTY and rendered the
following statement to wit: Judgment amount $173,226.70, interest on Judgment
from October 1, 2014 through November 13, 2014, $2,068.19, Sheriffs fees:
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(services, return, postings, commission, mailings, and certificate of sale) $187.17,
recording fees: Certificate of Sale: $10.00, Sheriff's costs and fees: $197.17, less
amount credit bid by Plaintiff: $100.00, amount still owed on Judgment:
$175,392.06.
The creditor rights-property interests upon which the sheriff did levy, advertise, notify and
declared in his return were all addressed in the plural. The result of this levy and sale was that the
Sheriff seized and sold all of Sharon K. Smith's property interests that arose within the civil
proceeding, Smith vs. Smith, Case No. CV-DR-1990-12684. Any interested potential bidder, in
order to make an informed decision as to whether or not to bid, and in what amount to bid, at that
November 13, 2014 sheriffs sale, was adequately notified to inquire from the writ of execution
and the notice of sale, the scope and nature of the property interests arising out of the Smith vs.

Smith civil proceeding, that were being sold - a case file containing various creditor rights-property
interests, the reference to which was also recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office.
I. C. §§11-301 and 11-304, both provide deference to directions as provided by a judgment
debtor who is personally present at the sale, as to the order in which the personal property that has
been levied upon may be sold. If the judgment debtor is not personally present at the sale, the
sheriff is granted the necessary discretion to determine the order of sale, and the amount of property
that should be sold in order to satisfy the writ of execution.
On this point Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, supra, made the relevant observation that "Chance
failed to protect her own interests by submitting a credit bid or attending the sale ... " 154 Idaho
at 730, 302 P.3d at 355, and went on to further observe that one, "who fails to protect its interests
in the sale might not find a sympathetic ear in the courts." 154 Idaho at 729, 302 P.3d at 354.
Although Bergmann indicated she did not know what property interest was to be sold at
the sheriff's sale, prior to the date of the sale, specific and adequate reference was made to the civil
proceeding out of which the creditor rights-property interests to be attached and sold had arisen,
receiving the writ, the notice of levy, and the claim forms. The only recognized property interests
arising out of that civil proceeding were here creditor rights-property interests, reflecting
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judgments and a series of purported renewals. In light of this fact, there is simply no grounds for
any claim she misunderstood what case file and what contents was being sold, and to argue
otherwise is most disingenuous.
Once again, in Suchan v, Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741P.2d 1289 (1986), the Court
determined that neither gross inadequacy in the sale price, nor any irregularity in the conduct of
the sale will be declared if it is based upon any misunderstanding of one 's legal rights, as such
situation does not constitute an irregularity in the conduct of a sheriffs sale. Suchan stated the
applicable general rule as follows:
In general, parcels not adapted for separate and distinct enjoyment should be sold
as a unit. However, under I.C. § 11-304 if the party directing the order of sale can
show in an intelligible manner the particular way in which the property can be
profitably sold in parcels, the general rule will not apply and the sheriff must follow
his directions. Gaskill, 77 Idaho at 432, 292 P.2d at 960; 113 Idaho at 109, 741
P.2d at 1296.
In the absence of any direction from the judgment debtor, this general rule was properly
followed by the Ada County sheriff in the conduct of the sheriffs sale in this matter.
The Court again restated the Suchan standard in Scifaris Unlimited, LLC v. Von Jones, 163
Idaho 874, 421 P.3d 205 (2018):
The Suchan Court did not find that the sale price was grossly inadequate but, more
relevant to this case, found there was no irregularity in the sale. Id. The Court
indicated that the judgment creditor's "misunderstanding of her legal rights, though
unfortunate, is not an irregularity in the sale itself" Id. at 109, 741 P.2d at 1296.
The Court also noted that, "[b ]y [the judgment creditor's] failure to bid the
$100,000 plus interest, [she] did not preserve her judgment lien for this amount."
Id. at 108, 741 P.2d at 1295.163 Idaho at 885, 421 P.3d at 216.
It simply comes down to this: Bergmann failed to attend the sheriff's sale, and her failure
to attend does not constitute any irregularity in the sale. Similar to the situation that was before
the Court in Safaris, involving the Sliger litigation, wherein there were property interest within a
single case file then in litigation, and that Sliger litigation file was levied upon, wherein the Jones'
interests were contained, and were sold as a single unit for one money, and no irregularity was
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identified in the conduct of that sale within the discussion of the Safaris court .. The matter was
remanded for a determination of "approximate valuation" of the property interests contained
within the litigation case file, and the court gave no indication there was to be inferred any
irregularity in the sale process, by dicta or otherwise.

The Ada County Sheriff performed as

permitted by the statute in selling all of the creditor rights-property interests identified and
contained within this specifically identified case file, as a single unit or one lot sale.
In summary, the evidence within the record of this proceeding does not support the
existence of any "additional circumstance" or "irregularity" in the conduct of the sheriff's sale to
justify setting the sale aside.
In the absence of any irregularity, is there need to get intensely entwined in a debate as to
the "adequacy" of the consideration paid at the sale, or even the "approximate value" of the
property interests found within the case file, as the standard to be applied in these controversies is
that without irregularity in the sale, or slight additional circumstances, the court is without
authority to invalidate a sheriff's sale. See Phillips v. Blazier-Henry, supra; Safaris unlimited,

supra.

v.
CONCLUSION ... ----····. .

For all the reasons stated above, the Order
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r court, s~side the s ~ fs

nd the sheriff's sale fully effect ated
sale conducted on November 13, 2014, should be vk_ated
"'-~....._¾
and reinstated.
Dated this 15th day of October, 2019.
Vernon K. Smith
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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